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Predictions about the trajectory and effects of climate change cannot be made with complete 
certainty, so acknowledging uncertainty may increase trust in scientists and public acceptance of 
their messages. Here we show that this is true regarding expressions of fully-bounded 
uncertainty, unless they are accompanied by acknowledgements of irreducible uncertainty as 
well. A representative national sample of Americans read predictions of the effects of global 
warming on sea level that included either a worst-case scenario (partially-bounded uncertainty), 
or the best and worst cases (fully-bounded uncertainty). Compared to a control condition, 
expressing fully-bounded uncertainty, but not partially-bounded uncertainty, increased trust in 
scientists and acceptance of their message. However, accompanying fully-bounded uncertainty 
with acknowledgement that the full effects of sea level rise cannot be quantified (because of 
unpredictable storm surges) eliminated the constructive impact of fully-bounded uncertainty on 
trust and message acceptance. Thus, expressions of fully-bounded uncertainty alone may 
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enhance confidence in scientists and their assertions, but not when the full extent of inevitable 
uncertainty is acknowledged. 
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The study of global warming inherently entails uncertainty, which arises from the 
incomplete understanding of the climate system and its natural variability, the long timescales 
involved, and the difficulty of anticipating human activities. Climate scientists routinely 
acknowledge such uncertainty. For example, in 2000, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change’s (IPCC) Assessment Report expressed uncertainty in various assessments1. 
Acknowledgements of uncertainty are necessary to accurately and honestly depict scientific 
knowledge. But uncertainty may have undesirable effects on trust and message acceptance in the 
general public. Specifically, acknowledging uncertainty may cause people to hesitate before 
believing findings and thereby undermine the impact of scientific evidence. In fact, much 
research documents that acknowledging uncertainty can decrease message acceptance. People 
are more persuaded by eyewitness testimony2,3 and advice from experts4-9 when delivered with 
greater certainty. And when scientists describe their uncertainty about risk, this sometimes leads 
people to conclude that the scientists are incompetent10,11.  
However, evidence suggesting that uncertainty undermines experts’ claims may not 
generalize to situations in which complete certainty is implausible. One definition of being 
trustworthy is that a person’s opinions are honestly based on available information12, so if a 
source expresses unwarranted high confidence, this may undermine trust13,14. For example, 
extremely high confidence is hard to justify when predicting the future. When given a 
deterministic forecast of the weather (e.g., a low of 30 degrees), more than 95% of people infer 
uncertainty, anticipating that the real temperature will fall in a range around the prediction15,16. 
The same is true for financial predictions17. If a natural scientist were to make a prediction 
without acknowledging any uncertainty, this might seem implausible to a thoughtful recipient of 
the message. In contrast, if a scientist were to make a prediction accompanied by an expression 
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of uncertainty, the scientist might gain credibility for acknowledging his or her inability to know 
exactly what will happen in the future.   
Uncertainty can be acknowledged in multiple ways. The IPCC’s Fourth and Fifth 
Assessment Synthesis Reports (AR4 SYR and AR5 SYR)18,19 contain various uncertainty 
expressions (see Supplemental Note 1). Many expressions accompany predictions with bounded 
uncertainty, meaning they specify bounds on the range of possible outcomes, impacts, and/or 
timescales, in a form similar to a confidence interval around a prediction (e.g., “Global mean 
sea-level rise is expected to reach between 14 and 44 cm within this century”, p. 180 of AR4) but 
without specifying the likelihood associated with each of the bounds of the prediction interval.  
The research reported here examined the impact of acknowledging uncertainty in two 
different ways that have been common in science communications about global warming: 
(1) fully-bounded uncertainty (e.g., “Global warming will cause sea level to rise about four feet, 
but it could be as little as one foot or as much as seven feet”), which conveys a best-case and 
worst-case scenario around a prediction, and (2) high-partially-bounded uncertainty, which 
describes only a worst-case scenario. Because low-partially-bounded uncertainty (i.e., a most 
likely future plus a best-case scenario) is relatively uncommon in science communication (see 
Supplemental Note 1), we did not examine the effects of such expressions. 
Expressing uncertainty in these ways may have a variety of effects on public reactions to 
a scientist’s message. High-partially-bounded uncertainty might increase trust and acceptance of 
scientists’ claims compared to no uncertainty, because admitting to not knowing the future with 
complete certainty may seem more credible. And high-partially-bounded uncertainty might 
induce concern among message recipients, because it acknowledges uncertainty and highlights 
severe outcomes. Previous research indeed suggests that worst-case scenarios can bias 
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individuals toward more extreme estimates and facilitate action20,21. However, high-partially-
bounded predictions might lead to exaggerated, inaccurate estimates, thus misleading the 
public20, and/or might be seen as transparently manipulative attempts to whip up public concern, 
thus undermining trust and persuasion.  
Expressing fully-bounded uncertainty may also have various possible effects. Past 
research suggests that presenting this form of uncertainty may cause cognitive overload and 
confusion22, particularly among people who are less educated and for whom understanding 
messages including uncertainty is more challenging23,24. This might decrease trust and message 
acceptance among such individuals. Or perhaps people might choose to focus their thinking on 
the best-case scenario (as past research suggests20) and discount the worst-case scenario in order 
to feel less anxious. Alternatively, describing a most likely future plus a best-case scenario and a 
worst-case scenario might be an especially effective communication strategy. A scientist who 
employs this approach might be viewed as especially trustworthy and, consequently, might be 
especially persuasive. This prediction resonates with research showing that people viewed 
scientists who acknowledged study limitations (e.g., saying might, could) as more trustworthy 
and accepted their messages more25-27.  
The current study took two different approaches to gauging the impact on trust in 
scientists and message acceptance of acknowledging high-partially bounded uncertainty or fully-
bounded uncertainty about global warming-induced future sea level rise (SLR). The first 
approach involved offering a prediction of the amount of SLR that is likely and placing bounds 
on that prediction. Such a prediction focuses on the damage caused to buildings and land use 
caused by a fixed amount of increase in sea level: leading buildings to be flooded and abandoned 
or retrofitted, reducing values of coastline property, and increasing the cost of insurance.   
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The second approach involved accompanying predictions of SLR with acknowledgement 
that the full extent of the consequences of such rise cannot be quantified or bounded, even if the 
amount of likely SLR can be. This is because the impact of rising sea level along coasts 
magnifies damage caused by storm surges. That is, storms cause sea water to cause damage 
farther inland than under non-storm conditions. If the frequency and intensity of storms will 
increase in the future, but do so unpredictably, then any bounding of the amount of likely SLR 
becomes uninformative, because the important, acknowledged consequences of SLR due to 
storms cannot be bounded.   
Indeed, scientists have routinely noted that global warming is likely to cause an increase 
in severe storms28,29. And such storms have been said to occur unpredictably and to temporarily 
enhance the damage from SLR, sometimes devastatingly. For example, publications by the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration state “By 2100, storm surges will happen on 
top of an additional 8 inches to 6.6 feet of global sea level rise.”30 Thus, an expression of 
bounded uncertainty was presented not in isolation, but in the context of an acknowledgment that 
the full extent of undesirable consequences of SLR cannot be quantified. Acknowledging 
uncertainty via this additional contextual information about storm surges may undermine the 
constructive impact of acknowledging uncertainty about SLR. 
The present experiment entailed a 3 (bounded uncertainty) x 2 (irreducible uncertainty vs. 
no irreducible uncertainty) between-subjects design (see Table 1) embedded in a survey of a 
nationally representative sample of American adults (N = 1174). Respondents were randomly 
assigned to read a statement offering only a prediction of the most likely amount of future SLR 
(no uncertainty), a prediction of the most likely amount of SLR plus a worst-case scenario (high-
partially-bounded uncertainty), or a prediction of the most likely amount of SLR plus 
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descriptions of worst-case and best-case scenarios (fully-bounded uncertainty). Half of the 
respondents (randomly assigned) read a second statement acknowledging irreducible uncertainty 
(i.e., that global warming-induced storms will unpredictably exacerbate the impact of gradual 
SLR). This study design allows assessment of whether bounded uncertainty expressions have 
less impact when they are accompanied by well-meaning additional context showing that the full 
extent of damage cannot in fact be quantified. After reading the message, respondents answered 
questions assessing their acceptance of the scientists’ predictions. Trust in scientists was also 
measured to test the cognitive mechanisms through which expressions of uncertainty affect 
message acceptance. Specifically, we tested whether the effect of expressions of bounded 
uncertainty on message acceptance is mediated by trust in scientists (i.e., whether changes in 




Table 1: Experimental Design 
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Bounded uncertainty with or without irreducible uncertainty 
 Raw mean message acceptance scores and mean trust in scientists are presented in 
Supplemental Figure 1 and Supplemental Table 1. Below, we describe the results of analyses that 
control for demographic variables, political party identification, and liberal-conservative 
ideology (see Table 2, Supplemental Table 2 and Supplemental Note 2), to optimize the 
robustness of results. Supplemental Note 3, Supplemental Tables 3 and 4, and Supplemental 
Figure 2 present results of analyses done without these controls, which yielded similar results to 
those with the controls. 
 Scientists expressing high-partially-bounded uncertainty affected respondents similarly 
regardless of whether or not they read about the unpredictable consequences of SLR due to 
storms, in terms of message acceptance, bInteraction=-0.01, t(1139)=-0.18, p=0.858, partial 
R2=0.00, and trust, bInteraction=0.12, z(1139)=0.55, p=0.585, OR=1.13 (Table 2, row 4). However, 
scientists expressing fully-bounded uncertainty affected respondents differently depending on 
whether or not they also read irreducible uncertainty about the unpredictable consequences of 
SLR due to storms, in terms of both message acceptance, bInteraction=-0.17, t(1139)=-3.63, 
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p<0.001, partial R2=0.01, and trust, bInteraction=-0.53, z(1139)=-2.39, p=0.013, OR=0.59 (Table 2, 
row 5).  
Therefore, in what follows, we describe how bounded uncertainty affected respondents 
when they did not read about irreducible uncertainty, and then, we examine how bounded 
uncertainty affected respondents when they did. 
Partially-bounded uncertainty  
 Reading expressions of a worst-case scenario did not alter message acceptance or trust. 
Message acceptance was the same after reading scientists expressing high-partially-bounded 
uncertainty as after reading an expression with no uncertainty, b=-0.01, t(1139)=-0.20, p=0.844, 
d=-0.02 (Table 2, row 1, column 1). Likewise, respondents who read high-partially-bounded 
uncertainty expressed the same trust in scientists as did people who read no expression of 





Table 2: OLS Regression Coefficients Predicting Message Acceptance and Probit Regression 
Coefficients Predicting Trust in Scientists  
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N 1167  1167  
     
Adjusted R2 .15  .08  
 
Notes: Presented are unstandardized OLS regression coefficients (in the first column) and probit 
regression coefficients (in the second column), with standard errors in parentheses and 95% 
confidence intervals for the regression coefficients in brackets. Rows 1 and 2 represent the 
simple effects of high-partially bounded and fully-bounded uncertainty when irreducible 
uncertainty was not mentioned. Row 3 represents the simple effect of irreducible uncertainty 
when no uncertainty was mentioned. Among the predictors in these regressions were dummy 
variables identifying people who failed to answer each question.  Coefficients for those dummy 
variables are not shown. The omitted substantive categories for the other dummy variable 
predictors were no bounded uncertainty and no irreducible uncertainty. This table omits 
coefficients for the demographic controls for brevity of presentation; Supplemental Table 2 
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presents the same information from this table including the coefficients for the demographic 
controls and Supplemental Note 2 discusses the control variables. An adjusted McFadden 
peusdo-R2 is presented for the model predicting trust. See Supplemental Note 4 for question 
wording and coding of measures in the table. 
 
*** p<.001 ** p<.01 * p<.05 + p<.10 
 
 
Fully-bounded uncertainty without irreducible uncertainty  
Reading fully-bounded uncertainty led to marginally significantly more message 
acceptance compared to no bounded uncertainty, b=0.06, t(1139)=1.93, p=0.054, d=0.18 (Table 
2, row 2, column 1). Furthermore, respondents who read fully-bounded uncertainty expressed 
marginally significantly more trust in scientists than did people who read no bounded 
uncertainty, b=0.25, z(1139)=1.71, p=0.087, OR=1.29 (Table 2, row 2, column 2). Fully-
bounded uncertainty also marginally significantly increased trust in scientists and message 
acceptance when compared to high-partially-bounded uncertainty (see Supplemental Note 5). 
Because respondents who read no uncertainty and who read high-partially-bounded uncertainty 
did not differ significantly from one another, statistical power can be maximized by combining 
those groups. Doing so causes the increases in message acceptance and trust due to fully-
bounded uncertainty to become statistically significant, bMessageAcceptance=0.07, t(1141)=2.43, 
p=0.015, d=0.19, bTrust=.25, z(1141)=1.96, p=0.050, OR=1.28. 
The effect of expressing fully-bounded uncertainty on message acceptance was mediated31 by 
trust in scientists. Acknowledging fully-bounded uncertainty caused an increase trust in scientists 
(a1=0.25, p=0.050, see Figure 1, top panel), which in turn caused an increase in message 
acceptance (b1=0.37, p<0.001).  
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The direct effect of acknowledging fully-bounded uncertainty on message acceptance 
(c1=0.07, p=0.015) was significantly reduced when controlling for the mediator (trust in 
scientists), (c1’=0.04, p=0.098). Confidence intervals for the indirect effect based on 
bootstrapping with 5,000 simulations indicated that the average causal mediation effect was 0.03, 
p=0.04, with a 95% confidence interval that did not include zero [0.003, 0.06], meaning that the 
mediational hypothesis was supported. The same mediational pattern was seen when comparing 
fully-bounded uncertainty to high-partially-bounded uncertainty (see Supplemental Note 6 and 
Supplemental Figure 3). Sensitivity analyses replicated the same basic results using other 
plausible analytic approaches, reinforcing confidence in these conclusions (see Supplemental 
Note 732-34).  
Partially-bounded uncertainty with irreducible uncertainty  
Respondents who read high-partially-bounded uncertainty with the irreducible 
uncertainty regarding unpredictable consequences manifested the same level of message 
acceptance as respondents who read no uncertainty while reading about irreducible uncertainty, 
b=-0.02, SE=0.03, t(1139)=-0.44, p=0.663, d=-0.04, and reported the same level of trust in 
scientists, b=0.14, SE=0.17, z(1139)=0.82, p=0.413, OR=1.14. Thus, regardless of whether or not 
scientists described irreducible uncertainty regarding unpredictable consequences of global 
warming via storms and storm surge, including a worst-case scenario again did not affect 
message acceptance or trust. 
Fully-bounded uncertainty with irreducible uncertainty  
Among people who read about irreducible uncertainty regarding the consequences of 
SLR via storm surges, respondents who read fully-bounded uncertainty manifested significantly 
less message acceptance than did respondents who read no or partially-bounded uncertainty, b=-
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0.11, SE=0.03, t(1139)=-3.20, p=0.001, d=-0.31, and reported significantly less trust in scientists, 
b=-0.34, SE=0.13, z(1139)=-2.55, p=0.011, OR=0.71.  
Trust in scientists also mediated the negative impact of fully-bounded uncertainty on 
message acceptance in this context. Acknowledging fully-bounded uncertainty caused an 
decrease trust in scientists (a1=-0.34, p=0.011, see Figure 1, bottom panel), which in turn caused 
an increase in message acceptance (b1=0.37, p<0.001). The direct effect of acknowledging fully-
bounded uncertainty on message acceptance (c1=-0.11, p=0.001) was significantly reduced when 
controlling for the mediator (trust in scientists), (c1’=-0.06, p=0.014). The average causal 
mediation effect was -0.04, p=0.03, and the 95% confidence interval for the indirect effect did 
not include zero: [-0.07, -0.001], meaning that the mediational hypothesis was supported. 
Sensitivity analyses replicated the same basic results (see Supplemental Note 5). 
Thus, fully-bounded uncertainty reduced message acceptance by reducing trust when 
scientists also acknowledged irreducible uncertainty. 
None of the effects described above were significantly moderated by respondents’ 
cognitive skills (measured by respondents’ level of formal education) or political party 
affiliations (see Supplemental Notes 8 and 9).  
Discussion 
This study explores the impact of fully-bounded uncertainty on trust in scientists and 
acceptance of their predictions, and testing mediational pathways of effects, in a nationally 
representative sample of American adults. In addition, it tests how bounded uncertainty 
expressions affect the public when they are presented with additional information illustrating that 
the consequences of predictions cannot be fully quantified, and that uncertainty is thus 
irreducible. The findings suggest that expressions of bounded uncertainty can indeed improve 
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acceptance of climate scientists’ findings. In the absence of information about irreducible 
uncertainty, fully-bounded uncertainty increased message acceptance because it increased trust 
in scientists. These effects appeared equally strongly among people with limited cognitive skills 
and with strong cognitive skills (see Supplemental Note 9), suggesting that uncertainty messages 
are easy to process and to use, resonating with other research35,36. Moreover, the effects of fully 
bounded uncertainty appear to occur regardless of a person’s a priori skepticism toward global 
warming (see Supplemental Note 8).  
However, expressing fully-bounded uncertainty while acknowledging that the full 
consequences of SLR are unpredictable eliminates the constructive impact of expressing fully-
bounded uncertainty about the amount of SLR alone. Because scientists often acknowledge the 
consequences of SLR due to storm surges, this suggests that in most real-world contexts there 
may be no benefits to be gained by placing bounds on predicted SLR18,30, and perhaps some 
adverse consequences. The irreducible uncertainty respondents read in this experiment 
emphasized the worst case scenario (e.g., “Scientists believe that global warming will cause 
these storms to be more intense in the future…”) and this may have affected respondents’ 
judgments. Future research could explore other ways of acknowledging irreducible uncertainty 
and their effects. 
Although the effects of the expressions of uncertainty on message acceptance were small-
to-medium by standard conventions37, it is notable that brief exposure to one message could shift 
global warming attitudes. Repeated exposure to these kinds of messages over time may enhance 
the magnitude of their impact38. 
Our findings resonate with those of prior studies24 using convenience samples of students 
and adults. Surprisingly, however, those studies suggested that a form of fully-bounded 
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uncertainty increased trust only among highly educated respondents and did not among less 
educated respondents. Using a large, representative national sample of American adults, our 
study disconfirmed that finding and thereby suggests that the constructive effects of fully 
bounded uncertainty expressions are not limited to cognitively sophisticated individuals.  
Our findings offer a new interpretation of the finding of a second prior investigation39 
comparing different types of bounded uncertainty expressions that refer to future time or 
outcome magnitude. Respondents exposed to the former type of uncertainty were subsequently 
more supportive of government action on global warming than respondents exposed to the latter 
type of uncertainty. But without a group of respondents who read predictions made with no 
uncertainty, it is impossible to disentangle the effects of expressing uncertainty on support (e.g., 
they could have both increased support for government action or both decreased it). The present 
study suggests that both are likely to have increased support.  
Bounding a sea level rise prediction with only the worst case did not enhance message 
acceptance or trust. This suggests that attempts to catastrophize by focusing only on how bad 
things can get may not be effective. We look forward to future research examining the impact of 
the rarely-expressed (see Supplemental Note 1) best-case-only type of bounding, which can 
reveal whether the present finding of no impact of partial bounding generalizes to that type of 
partial bounding. 
The versions of fully-bounded uncertainty examined here were accompanied by a best 
guess (i.e., the 4-foot estimate) rather than presenting best-case and worst-case scenarios alone 
(i.e., “Sea level could rise between 1 and 7 feet”). This ensured that all participants received the 
same information about the best guess and allowed testing the impact of adding the worst-case 
scenario to it. However, as ranges of outcomes have often been presented without a best guess in 
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science communication (see Supplemental Note 1), these expressions of uncertainty should be 
compared in future research. In addition, future studies might explore the consequences of 
quantifying the likelihoods of the bounds of the prediction interval, as is the case with confidence 
intervals (i.e., confidence intervals quantify the level of confidence that a parameter lies within a 
specified range).  
The present research rebuts the often-heard claim that expressing uncertainty undermines 
persuasion. Lay audiences often operate on the assumption that acknowledging uncertainty 
acknowledges weakness. Psychologists have found that uncertainty is aversive and that people 
are motivated to reduce it40. Therefore, one might imagine that the public would turn away from 
experts who make claims while acknowledging their own lack of full understanding. But people 
seem to recognize that complete certainty in future predictions is not possible, especially in the 
context of global warming. Scientists who openly admit the limitations inherent in their 
predictions may bolster their credibility and as a result may increase the appropriate use of 
scientific findings by non-experts41-43.  But these gains may be nullified, and even reversed, 
when scientists acknowledge that no matter how confidently they can make predictions about 
some future scenarios, the full extent of the consequences of those predictions cannot be 
quantified. Optimal communication about climate change may involve presenting uncertainty 
that has predictable bounds without overwhelming the public with the discussion of factors 




Interviews were conducted with a nationally representative random, probability sample of 
1,174 American adults via the Internet by GfK Custom Research between March 7 and 18, 2013. 
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The questionnaire was administered in both English and Spanish.  
Respondents were drawn randomly from among the members of GfK’s KnowledgePanel, 
American adults who were selected from the population via probability sampling. Some panel 
members were recruited via random-digit dialing (RDD) telephone calls, and other panel 
members were recruited via mailed invitations to households selected randomly via address-
based sampling. If needed, households were given computers and access to the Internet at no 
cost, to allow them to answer questionnaires via the Internet. When people joined the panel, GfK 
collected demographic information such as sex, age, race/ethnicity, education, and income.  
Then, occasional e-mails inviting panel members to complete questionnaires were sent (for 
details on the recruitment of GfK’s KnowledgePanel, see Supplemental Note 10). 
Three days after the initial invitation to complete a survey was sent, automatic email 
reminders were sent to non-responding panel members, and telephone calls were sometimes 
made to remind people as well. To thank them for their efforts, panel members were entered into 
raffles or sweepstakes offering cash rewards and other prizes. 
The data for the survey were weighted to account for unequal probabilities of selection 
and to post-stratify in terms of age, sex, race and ethnicity, education, census region, household 
income, home ownership status, metropolitan area, Spanish language usage, and Internet access, 
using targets from the February, 2013, Current Population Survey (CPS), conducted by the U.S. 
Census Bureau, the 2010 Pew Hispanic Center Survey (which provided the most recent 
measurements of Spanish language usage), and the October, 2010, CPS supplemental survey 
measuring Internet access. Supplemental Table 5 displays distributions of unweighted and 
weighted demographics of the survey sample and national benchmarks from the February, 2013, 
Current Population Survey. These distributions show that the survey sample was similar to the 
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American population before the weights were applied and was more similar after the data were 
weighted. Results reported in this paper were computed using weighted data. 
Experimental Conditions 
At the beginning of the survey, all respondents read an introduction: 
“During this survey, when we say ‘global warming’, we will mean the idea that the 
world’s temperature has been increasing over the last 100 years and will increase in the 
future.  Next, you will read some things that scientists who study global warming have 
said about its effects in the future.  Please read the information on the next screen(s). 
Then, we’ll ask whether you remember hearing or reading information like this before 
today.” 
Respondents read the following passages in each of the six experimental conditions: 
 (1) No uncertainty (single estimate for sea level rise (SLR) and no irreducible 
uncertainty; N=192):  
“Scientists believe that, during the next 100 years, global warming will cause the 
surface of the oceans around the world to rise about 4 feet. In the United States, 
sea level rise will mostly affect towns and cities along the coasts, where millions 
of people live and work. Sea level rise will gradually flood these areas, so people 
living and working along the coasts will have to move their homes and businesses 
to other places, farther from the ocean.   
If sea level rises by 4 feet and nothing is done to prepare for it, about 5 million 
Americans who currently live and work less than 4 feet above sea level will have 
to move out of their homes and businesses.” 
(2) High partially bounded uncertainty (estimate plus worst-case estimate for SLR and no 
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irreducible uncertainty; N=199): Respondents assigned to this condition read the following 
passage:  
“Scientists believe that, during the next 100 years, global warming will cause the surface 
of the oceans around the world to rise about 4 feet. However, sea level could rise as much 
as 7 feet. In the United States, sea level rise will mostly affect towns and cities along the 
coasts, where millions of people live and work. Sea level rise will gradually flood these 
areas, so people living and working along the coasts will have to move their homes and 
businesses to other places, farther from the ocean.   
If sea level rises by 4 feet and nothing is done to prepare for it, about 5 million 
Americans who currently live and work less than 4 feet above sea level will have to move 
out of their homes and businesses. If sea level rises by 7 feet and nothing is done to 
prepare for it, about 8 million Americans who currently live and work less than 7 feet 
above sea level will have to move out of their homes and businesses.” 
In the context of sea level rise, one might consider the “worst-case scenario” to be more 
extreme, e.g., sudden massive flooding caused by polar ice caps melting. For this study, we are 
concerned instead with a worst-case scenario that represents the upper bounds of a range in 
which scientists are reasonably confident that sea level rise might fall. 
 (3) Fully-bounded uncertainty (estimate plus worst and best-case estimates for SLR and 
no irreducible uncertainty; N=213): Respondents read the following passage:  
“Scientists believe that, during the next 100 years, global warming will cause the surface 
of the oceans around the world to rise about 4 feet. However, sea level could rise as little 
as 1 foot, or it could rise by as much as 7 feet.  In the United States, sea level rise will 
mostly affect towns and cities along the coasts, where millions of people live and work. 
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Sea level rise will gradually flood these areas, so people living and working along the 
coasts will have to move their homes and businesses to other places, farther from the 
ocean.   
If sea level rises by 1 foot and nothing is done to prepare for it, about 1 million 
Americans who currently live and work less than 1 foot above sea level will have to 
move out of their homes and businesses. If sea level rises by 4 feet and nothing is done to 
prepare for it, about 5 million Americans who currently live and work less than 4 feet 
above sea level will have to move out of their homes and businesses. If sea level rises by 
7 feet and nothing is done to prepare for it, about 8 million Americans who currently live 
and work less than 7 feet above sea level will have to move out of their homes and 
businesses.” 
  (4) Irreducible uncertainty (single estimate for SLR and storm statement; N=194): 
Respondents read the same passage about sea level rise as respondents in condition (1) and then 
read the following additional passage about storms:  
“This rise in sea level will make hurricanes, cyclones, and other storms worse for people 
living and working near the coast. Scientists believe that global warming will cause these 
storms to be more intense in the future.  During these storms, oceans will surge as high as 
20 feet along hundreds of miles of coastline and will suddenly flood cities with large 
amounts of water.  These floods will be more damaging over the years as sea level rises, 
and floods will be even worse when storms hit during high tide. For example, Hurricane 
Sandy caused ocean surges as high as 14 feet and flooded tunnels, buildings, and other 
parts of New York and New Jersey.” 
 (5) High partially bounded uncertainty plus irreducible uncertainty (estimate plus worst-
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case for SLR and storm statement; N=176): Respondents read the same passage about sea level 
rise as respondents in condition (2) and then read the same passage about storms as respondents 
in condition (4).  
  (6) Fully-bounded uncertainty plus irreducible uncertainty (estimate plus worst-case and 
best-case estimates for SLR and storm statement; N=200): Respondents read the same passage 
about sea level rise as respondents in condition (3) and then read the same passage about storms 
as respondents in condition (4).  
Thus, respondents read one of six messages describing scientists’ predictions: (1) no 
uncertainty, describing the most likely amount of future sea level rise (i.e., “global warming will 
cause the surface of the oceans around the world to rise about 4 feet”), (2) high-partially-
bounded uncertainty, describing a most likely amount plus a worst-case scenario (i.e., “…about 
4 feet. However, sea level could rise as much as 7 feet”), (3) fully-bounded uncertainty, 
describing a most likely amount, a worst-case scenario, and a best-case scenario (i.e., “…about 4 
feet. However, sea level could rise as little as 1 foot, or it could rise by as much as 7 feet”), 
(4)  irreducible uncertainty, describing the most likely amount of future sea level rise and the 
potential for storm surges (i.e., “floods will be more damaging over the years as sea level rises, 
and floods will be even worse when storms hit during high tide”), (5) high-partially-bounded 
uncertainty plus irreducible uncertainty, describing the most likely amount of sea level rise, and 
a worst-case scenario plus the potential for storm surges, and (6) fully-bounded uncertainty plus  
irreducible uncertainty, describing the most likely amount of sea level rise, worst- and best-case 
scenarios, and the potential for storm surges.  
For information on how the estimates of sea level rise and population displacement were 
obtained, see Supplemental Note 11.  
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The research was approved by the Stanford University Institutional Review Board. 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants. 
Measures 
Respondents reported whether they remembered previously hearing or reading the 
presented information and then answered questions assessing their acceptance of the scientists’ 
messages about the consequences of global warming via sea level rise (see Supplemental Note 4 
for all question wordings their Spanish translations). 
Message acceptance.  The primary dependent variable was a measure of acceptance of 
the scientists’ messages about the consequences of global warming via sea level rise (3 items, 
α=.86). A participant’s message acceptance score was computed by averaging answers to the 
following questions coded as follows and therefore ranged from 0 (meaning the least concern) to 
1 (meaning the most concern). Analyses predicting each of these items separately yielded 
patterns consistent with those observed using the combined score.   
How serious the effects of global warming via SLR will be: Extremely serious = 1.0; Very 
serious = .75; Moderately serious = .5; Slightly serious = .25; Not serious at all = 0. 
How bad the effects of global warming via SLR will be: the product of believing global 
warming will cause SLR (coded 0 for no and 1 for yes) and the index of how bad SLR 
caused by global warming will be, the latter coded 0 if good, or leaning toward good, not 
leaning; 1 if very bad; .67 if somewhat bad; .33 leaning toward bad. 
How bad the effects of global warming via storms will be: the product of believing global 
warming will cause storms to be more damaging and the index of how bad the storms 
caused by global warming will be, the latter coded 0 if good, or leaning toward good, not 
leaning; 1 if very bad; .67 if somewhat bad; .33 leaning toward bad. 
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Higher scores indicate more acceptance of SLR global warming consequences. 
Correlations between these three items are presented in Supplemental Table 6. 
Trust in scientists.  We examined trust in scientists’ statements about the environment, 
as a potential mediator of the effects of admitting uncertainty on message acceptance. Trust in 
scientists was measured after the manipulation by the following question: “How much do you 
trust the things scientists say about the environment – completely, a lot, a moderate amount, a 
little, or not at all?”  A dichotomous variable “trust in scientists” was constructed and set to 1 for 
respondents who answered “Completely”, “A lot”, or “A moderate amount” and 0 for those who 
answered “A little” or “Not at all”. 
Demographics, political party identification, and political ideology.  Respondents 
reported their sex, age, race, Hispanic ethnicity, education, income, and zipcode of residence, as 
well as political party identification and liberal/conservative ideology.  Coastal dweller was a 
dichotomous variable coded 1 for respondents who lived in a county with a coastline bordering 
the open ocean and 0 for others.  Respondents’ reports of the zip codes of their residences were 
linked with a NOAA database to differentiate respondents who lived in a county with a coastline 
bordering the open ocean from all others. The NOAA database is available at 
www.census.gov/geo/reference/zctas.html. The list of coastal zip codes was developed using Zip 
Code Tabulation Areas developed by the U.S. Census Bureau for the 402 coastal counties 
included in the Economics: National Ocean Watch (ENOW) dataset (www.csc.noaa.gov/enow) 
created by the NOAA Coastal Services Center.  ENOW's list of counties 
http://www.csc.noaa.gov/digitalcoast/_/pdf/enow-counties-list.pdf is a modified version of 
NOAA's list of "Coastal Shoreline Counties", which includes all counties that have a coastline 
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bordering the open ocean or the Great Lakes or that contain coastal high hazard areas as defined 
by the Federal Emergency Management Agency.  
Missing data. Respondents were allowed to skip questions. Dummy variables identifying 
people who failed to answer any of the demographic questions were included as predictors in the 
regressions, and such respondents were assigned arbitrary values on demographics. This avoids 
losing the cases while also preventing distortion of the statistical results. If a participant 
answered at least one of the message acceptance questions, he or she was included in the 
analyses, using an average of the substantive answers he or she provided. Ten respondents 
refused to answer all of the index questions. A value for three of these people was imputed using 
multiple imputation methods44, one of the most reliable methods for handling missing data45. Ten 
respondents did not answer the question about trust in scientists. A value for trust in scientists 
was imputed for 7 of these 10 respondents using multiple imputation. The seven respondents for 
whom values on the index could not be imputed failed to answer so many other questions that 
imputation was not possible on either the index or trust in scientists, so these people were 
excluded from the analyses, resulting in a total usable sample of 1,167 people. 
Analysis Method 
 OLS linear regression was used to examine the impact of uncertainty on persuasion by 
predicting concern with the bounded uncertainty variable, the irreducible uncertainty variable, 
and their interaction, controlling for demographics and political party identification and 
ideology. A probit regression predicting trust in scientists with the same variables as in the linear 
regression gauged the causal impact of the uncertainty expression conditions tested in the 
experiment. All statistical tests were two-sided. We considered p-values <=0.05 as statistically 
significant and p-values between 0.050 and 0.10 as marginally significant. We calculated 95% 
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confidence intervals using the confint() function in R Statistical Software version 3.3.1 
(https://www.R-project.org/). For all estimates of probit regression coefficients, we gauged effect 
sizes with odds ratios, computed using the R function exp(coef()). For all estimates of OLS 
regression coefficients, we gauged effect sizes with Cohen’s d computed from the 
unstandardized regression coefficients, calculated using the R function esc_B from the R 
package esc46. 
Coding of variables to compare experimental conditions. Examining the interaction 
between the two variables (i.e., the bounded uncertainty variable and the irreducible uncertainty 
variable) allows us to determine whether participants responded differently to the expressions of 
bounded uncertainty about sea level rise depending on whether these expressions were also 
accompanied with the additional information about irreducible uncertainty regarding the 
consequences of global warming because of storms and storm surge. 
For the bounded uncertainty variable, we created two dummy variables to compare 
respondents who read no uncertainty to respondents who read (1) high-partially-bounded 
uncertainty and (2) fully-bounded uncertainty. Specifically, the first dummy variable, “high-
partially-bounded uncertainty”, was set to 1 for respondents assigned to condition (2) whereby 
they saw high-partially-bounded uncertainty and did not see irreducible uncertainty, and set to 0 
for respondents assigned to condition (1) (i.e., who read no uncertainty and did not see 
irreducible uncertainty) or respondents assigned to condition (3) (i.e., who read fully-bounded 
uncertainty and did not see irreducible uncertainty). The second dummy variable, “fully-bounded 
uncertainty”, was set to 1 for respondents assigned to condition (3) whereby they saw fully-
bounded uncertainty and did not see irreducible uncertainty, and set to 0 for respondents 
assigned to condition (1) (i.e., who read no uncertainty and did not see irreducible uncertainty) or 
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respondents assigned to condition (2) (i.e., who read high-partially-bounded uncertainty and did 
not see irreducible uncertainty). Because the models contained an interaction with the a 
irreducible uncertainty variable, the coefficients for these variables presented in Table 2 
represent the simple effects of high-partially-bounded uncertainty and fully-bounded uncertainty 
when no irreducible uncertainty was mentioned. 
For the irreducible uncertainty variable, we created one dummy variable to omit 
respondents who did not read about irreducible uncertainty and compare them to respondents 
who did read about irreducible uncertainty. This dummy variable was set to 1 for respondents 
assigned to conditions (4), (5), or (6), whereby respondents read about irreducible uncertainty, 
and set to 0 for respondents assigned to conditions (1), (2), or (3), whereby respondents did not 
read about irreducible uncertainty. Because the models contained an interaction with the 
bounded uncertainty variable, the coefficient for this variable presented in Table 2 represents the 
simple effect of reading about irreducible uncertainty when no uncertainty was mentioned. 
To examine the effects of bounded uncertainty when scientists also mentioned irreducible 
uncertainty, we re-ran the same analyses as described above (i.e., OLS linear regression and 
probit regression) but dummy coded the irreducible uncertainty variable to omit respondents who 
read about irreducible uncertainty as the base group. For these analyses, this dummy variable 
was set to 0 for respondents assigned to conditions (4), (5), or (6), whereby respondents read 
about irreducible uncertainty, and set to 1 for respondents assigned to conditions (1), (2), or (3), 
whereby respondents did not read about irreducible uncertainty. This allowed us to then examine 
the effects of bounded uncertainty among those respondents (i.e., by examining simple effects 
among those respondents).   




The data that support the findings of this study are available online at http://osf.io/tgmyh. 
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Figure 1:  Mediation analysis. Trust in scientists as a meditator of the effect of fully-bounded 
uncertainty, compared to no uncertainty in the without irreducible uncertainty (top panel) and 
with irreducible uncertainty (bottom panel) conditions. See Supplemental Note 4 for question 
wording and coding of measures in the figure. 
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